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In his third contribution to the Survey of Illinois Law, Professor Turk-
ington discusses the impact on Illinois law of a recent Unitted States Su-
preme Court decision examining defamation suits brought by private in-
dividuals. He also focuses upon three recent Illinois Supreme Court de-
cisions delineating the applicability of foreseeability to Illinois law-two
of the rulings interpret the concept of duty towards others, while the third
decision involves strict products liability. Additionally, the author analyzes
recent Illinois Supreme Court rulings that deal with the anticipation of the
criminal conduct of others and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in medical
malpractice cases.
INTRODUCTION
RAMATIC developments at the high state and federal appellate
court level characterized torts in the 1973-74 term. Most
importantly, the United States Supreme Court found substan-
tial portions of Illinois defamation law unconstitutional in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc.' This landmark decision might well stimulate
increased use of the private defamation suit in the state. At the state
court level, an important case of first impression was decided by the
Illinois Supreme Court. In Edgar County Bank and Trust Co. v.
Paris Hospital, Inc.,2 the court held for the first time that res ipsa
loquitor may be used to establish a prima facie case of negligence
against a physician.
* Professor, DePaul University College of Law.
1. 94 S. Ct. 2997 (1974).
2. 57 I11. 2d 298, 312 N.E.2d 259 (1974). This case is discussed at text accom-
panying notes 93-101 infra. Another case of significance to the Illinois torts lawyer
is Murphy v. Martin Oil Co., 56 Ill.2d 423, 308 N.E.2d 583 (1974), which held that
pain and suffering was recoverable under the survival statute for death directly re-
lated to the original injury. See Note, Death of Abatement Doctrine-Murphy v.
Martin Oil Co., 1973-1974 Survey of Illinois Law, 24 DEPAUL L. REv. 608 (1975).
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Several additional Illinois Supreme Court cases of considerable
significance to litigators and litigants also were decided. In no less
than six negligence and products liability cases3 the state supreme
court struggled with the role foreseeability is to play in Illinois tort
policy. Four of these six cases resulted in decisions against plaintiffs
in which Justice Goldenhersh dissented.4 It is startling for the high
court in this age of no fault, to devote this much of its limited re-
sources to the sufficiency of plaintiff's theory of negligence or strict
liability on the basis of foreseeability of injury. The concept of neg-
ligence and strict liability embodied in these decisions will have con-
siderable consequences on the direction of tort law in Illinois. Be-
cause of this development, extended analysis of the foreseeability
cases of this term follows.5
FROM New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
To Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,6 the United States Supreme
Court for the first time firmly granted constitutional protection for
defamatory utterances by deciding that libelous statements were
speech within the meaning of the first amendment. Prior to this
decision, dictum in several Supreme Court cases supported the view
that libel, like obscenity and profanity, was not constitutionally pro-
tected speech. 7 Although all nine Justices in New York Times were
in accord as to the principle that libel was first amendment speech,
3. Winnett v. Winnett, 57 111. 2d 7, 310 N.E.2d 1 (1974); Cunis v. Brennan, 56
Ill. 2d 372, 308 N.E.2d 617 (1974); Boyd v. Racine Currency Exch., Inc., 56 111. 2d
95, 306 N.E.2d 39 (1974); Ray v. Cock Robin, Inc., 57 Ill. 2d 19, 310 N.E.2d 9
(1974); Lewis v. Stran Steel Corp., 57 Ill. 2d 94, 311 N.E.2d 128 (1974); Barnes
v. Washington, 56 III.2d 22, 305 N.E.2d 535 (1973).
4. Winnett v. Winnett, 57 Il1. 2d 7, 310 N.E.2d 1 (1974); Cunis v. Brennan, 56
Ill. 2d 372, 308 N.E.2d 617 (1974); Boyd v. Racine Currency Exch., Inc., 56"Il1. 2d
95, 306 N.E.2d 39 (1974), Barnes v. Washington, 56 Ill. 2d 22, 305 N.E.2d 535
(1973).
5. See text accompanying notes 33-79 infra.
6. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
7. See generally Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Beauharnais v. Illi-
nois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942);
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION 518 (1970). The proposition that profane speech is not constitution-
ally protected speech has been seriously undermined by recent Supreme Court deci-
sions. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
there was disagreement amongst the Court on the scope of constitu-
tional protection. Justices Black, Douglas, and Goldberg felt that the
first amendment absolutely protected criticism of public officials.'
The remaining six Justices, in an opinion written by Justice Bren-
nan, adopted the view that money damages could be assessed consti-
tutionally against the New York Times only if the plaintiff showed
that the defamatory statement was published with malice. Malice
was defined as reckless disregard for the truth or knowledge that
the statement was false. The malice requirement was employed by
the majority in New York Times as a device which determined the
balance between the constitutional interest in free expression and
the tort interest in integrity of reputation.
The ten years that have passed since New York Times9 have wit-
nessed a nearly unending stream of state appellate court decisions
involving the scope of constitutional limits on tort judgments for
defamation.'0 During this period of time, the division in the Court
manifested in New York Times concerning the appropriate approach
broadened." In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press
v. Walker," involving judgments against the press for defaming pub-
lic figures, only Chief Justice Warren, Justice Brennan, and Justice
White agreed that malice was the device that ought to be employed
for providing the constitutional balance. Justices Harlan, Clark,
Stewart, and Fortas felt that the first amendment required only a
showing that defendant's publication of the defamatory utterance
8. Justices Black and Douglas also expressed a broader view of first amendment
protection in taking the position that the press had the unconditional right to say
what it pleased about public officials.
9. In a case decided shortly after New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme
Court extended the malice requirement to criminal libel. See Garrison v. Lousiana,
379 U.S. 64 (1964).
10. See, e.g., Noonan v. Rousselot, 239 Cal. App. 2d 447, 48 Cal. Rptr. 817
(1966); Rose v. Koch, 278 Minn. 235, 154 N.W.2d 409 (1967); Reaves v. Foster,
200 So. 2d 453 (Miss. 1967); Powell v. Monitor Publishing Co., 107 N.H. 83, 217
A.2d 193 (1966); Gilligan v. King, 48 Misc. 2d 212, 264 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct.
1965); Dempsey v. Time, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 754, 252 N.Y.S. 2d 186 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
11. E.g., the Supreme Court in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966), reversed
and remanded a libel judgment on behalf of Baer, a supervisor of a state recreation
center and ski resort. Six separate opinions were written in the case. See also Time,
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), where the malice requirement was applied to a
privacy action based upon false representations where the publication was a matter
of public interest.
12. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
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was "highly unreasonable conduct."'" Justices Black and Douglas
reaffirmed their view that no defamation judgment based upon state-
ments in the press was constitutional.
Further disagreement on the Court manifested itself in 1970 when
the Court dealt with a libel judgment won by a private individual
in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 4 Four separate views were ex-
pressed in the opinion. Justices Burger, Blackman, and Brennan
preserved the malice requirement in defamation cases involving
private individuals but would require proof of malice only when the
subject of the publication was a matter of public interest. Justice
White said malice was constitutionally required because the publica-
tion concerned actions of public officials. Three Justices, Harlan,
Marshall, and Stewart, rejected malice altogether in cases involving
private individuals and instead found that the first amendment
limited recovery in a defamation suit to actual injury. Justice Black
again said that the Constitution absolutely prohibited assessment of
a money judgment against the press for published defamatory state-
ments. Justice Douglas did not participate in the decision.
This considerable disagreement among the members of the Court
on the concept that should be employed in considering the applica-
tion of the first amendment in defamation suits was the backdrop
for a very important recent Supreme Court decision arising under
Illinois defamation law.
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,15 the Supreme Court again de-
cided a case involving application of the first amendment to defama-
tion judgments won by private individuals (hereafter referred to as
private defamation). American Opinion, an outlet for the views of
the John Birch Society, printed a story which falsely said that the
plaintiff, a Chicago attorney, had rigged a murder trial, had been
an official of a Marxist organization, and was a "Leninist" and "Com-
munist fronter." The story also said that the plaintiff had an arrest
record and was an officer of the National Lawyers Guild which had
13. Id. at 155. This view was based upon a balancing of interest analysis which
assigned a higher value to the interest in reputation part of the balance because public
figures do not have access to the media or rebuttal as readily as public officials do.
Thus a slightly less burdensome requirement was imposed on the plaintiff.
14. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
15. 94 S. Ct. 2997 (1974).
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planned the "Communist attack on the Chicago police during the
1968 Democratic convention."' 16
The plaintiff brought a diversity action against the publisher of
American Opinion for defamation in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois. After the jury had awarded a
$50,000 judgment, the trial judge entered a judgment for Welch,
holding that malice was a constitutional requirement for the plain-
tiff's case and had not been proved. On appeal the seventh circuit,
relying primarily on Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., affirmed.
The Supreme Court reversed with Justice Blackmun changing his
position from Rosenbloom and joining with Justices Powell, Rehn-
quist, Stewart, and Marshall to adopt a bare majority view that re-
covery in private defamation suits is constitutionally limited to actual
injury and malice need not be proved. Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Douglas, Brennan, and White dissented.
The consensus that emerges from Gertz by virtue of five justices
agreeing on an approach in private defamation suits is:
1. In defamation actions brought by public figures or public
officials, malice in the New York Times sense (knowledge of
the falsity of the statement or reckless disregard for the truth)
must be proved as part of the plaintiffs prima facie case.
2. In private defamation suits, as long as liability is not imposed
without fault, a state has autonomy in defining liability stan-
dards.
3. In private defamation libel suits, the first amendment and due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibit recovery
for presumed or punitive damages; only actual injury to reputa-
tion is recoverable.
Rejection of Malice in Private Defamation Suits and Illinois Law
Under the holding in Gertz, a state may constitutionally impose
liability for defamation of a private individual if the defendant was
at least negligent in publishing the defamatory utterance. Gertz
thus effectively overrules an aspect of the holding in Farnsworth v.
16. Id. at 3000. The Court noted that Gertz had been a member of the National
Lawyers Guild in the late fifties and noted that the record was barren of any evidence
that the Guild had taken any part in planning the 1968 Chicago demonstrations.
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Tribune Co.,l 7 decided by the Illinois Supreme Court in a decision
which predates Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. In Farnsworth the
Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed a judgment entered by the trial
court for the defendant partially on the basis that malice was re-
quired under the first and fourteenth amendment even in private
individual defamation suits whenever the subject matter of the publi-
cation is in an area of "critical public concern." As previously
noted, Gertz would require malice only when the plaintiff was a pub-
lic official or public figure within a restricted sense of the concept-
a limitation which would not apply to a person like the plaintiff in
Farnsworth.' Several Illinois appellate court and federal district
court decisions have followed Farnsworth and Rosenbloom v. Metro-
media, Inc. in extending the malice requirement to private defama-
tion suits. 10 These decisions are no longer valid precedent after
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
A second and important aspect of the holding in Farnsworth con-
cerning the constitutionality of section 4 of article II of the Illinois
Constitution also remains clouded by Gertz. Farnsworth involved
a series of three articles published by the Chicago Tribune in which
the plaintiff, a licensed osteopath, was referred to as a "quack."
The supreme-court affirmed a trial court judgment against plaintiff.
On appeal the plaintiff argued that section 4 of article II of the Il-
linois Constitution, which says that "Truth is a defense in a libel ac-
tion only when published with good motives and for justifiable ends,"
requires that an instruction to that effect be given to the jury and
that the instructions given violated the above provision because they
required plaintiff to prove that the utterances were false. Both con-
tentions were rejected by the court. In so doing, the court held that
instructions pursuant to section 4 of article II violated the first
amendment and that New York Times Co. v. Sullivan required the
plaintiff to prove that the publication was false and that it was made
17. 43 I11. 2d 286, 253 N.E.2d 408 (1969).
18. Plaintiff's attorney in Farnsworth was Elmer Gertz, the plaintiff in Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc. Attorney Gertz also was on the committee of the Illinois Con-
stitutional Convention which debated and drafted section 4 of article II of the consti-
tution, which played an important role.in the decision in Farnsworth.
19. See Alpine Construction Co. v. Demaris, 358 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. Ill. 1973);
Novel v. Garrison, 338 F. Supp. 977 (N.D. I11. 1971); Snead v. Forbes, Inc., 2 111.
App. 3d 22, 275 N.E.2d 746 (lst Dist. 1971).
[Vol. 24.-24 3
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with malice. Since the court's analysis of section 4 of article II is
inextricably tied to the constitutional requirement of malice and
since Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. would not require malice in a suit
on the facts of Farnsworth, the constitutionality of section 4 is still
an open question.20
Public Officials and Public Figures
The majority in Gertz limited the malice requirement to public
officials and public figures. Public figure was confined by the
majority to two limited senses. Justice Powell responded to the
argument that Gertz, by his service on city committees and his stat-
ure as an attorney, was a public figure:
Absent clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the community, and
pervasive involvement in the affairs of society, an individual should not be
deemed a public personality for all aspects of his life. It is preferable to
reduce the public figure question to a more meaningful context by looking
to the nature and extent of an individual's participation in the particular
controversy giving rise to the defamation.
In this context it is plain that petitioner was not a public figure. . . . He
plainly did not thiust himself into the vortex of this public issue, nor did he
engage the public's attention in an attempt to influence its outcome. 21
This language suggests that a party is a public figure for purposes
of the malice requirement if (a) the person is a celebrity (household
name) or (b) the person received considerable notoriety as a result
of active participation in the controversy giving rise to the defama-
tion. No Illinois case appears to be directly affected by the concept
of public figure established by the Court in Gertz. The concept of
public officials has been interpreted expansively in Illinois to include
(1) police sergeants, 22 (2) former police patrolmen,2 3 (3) a city at-
20. The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari this term on the con-
stitutionality of the imposition of a criminal sanction for publishing true statements
(the name of a rape victim). Thus an important United States Supreme Court case
relating to the constitutionality provision may be forthcoming. See Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 231 Ga. 60, 200 S.E.2d 127 (1973), prob. jutis. post., 94 S. Ct. 1406
(1974).
21. 94 S. Ct. at 3013.
22. Suchomel v. Suburban Life Newspapers, Inc., 84 Ill. App. 2d 239, 228 N.E.2d
172 (1st Dist. 1967), afj'd, 40 111. 2d 32, 240 N.E.2d 1 (1968).
23. Coursey v. Greater Niles Township Publishing Corp., 40 Ill. 2d 257, 239
N.E.2d 837 (1968).
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torney,24 (4) an administrator of a private nursing home,25 and (5)
an architect procurring furnishings for a public office. 26 Nothing in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. or other United States Supreme Court
decisions interpreting the concept of public officials significantly af-
fects the precedential value of these decisions.27
The Actual Injury Limitation on
Damage Judgments
In libel suits brought by private individuals, the Court -in Gertz
held that recovery is limited to actual injury. This aspect of the
holding in Gertz will significantly affect Illinois defamation law. In
Illinois, a presumption of damages operates in cases where the ut-
terance is not only defamatory on its face but also imputes to the
plaintiff (1) the commission of a criminal offense, (2) some con-
tagious disease which would exclude a person from society, (3) un-
fitness to perform duties of an office or employment, or (4) words
which prejudice the plaintiff in his profession or trade.28
In libel actions brought by private individuals on the basis of pub-
lication of a statement which is defamatory on its face and which
falls within one of the above four categories, a damage judgment
'assessed on the basis of a presumption of injury would be unconsti-
tutional. Gertz does not say whether a similar limitation would ap-
ply in defamation suits grounded on slander, which in Illinois involve
a presumption of damages if the previous stated conditions are
present. The reasoning of Gertz would support a distinction be-
24. Tunnell v. Edwardsville Intelligencer, Inc., 99 Il1. App. 2d 1, 241 N.E.2d 28
(5th Dist. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 43 Ill. 2d 239, 252 N.E.2d 538 (1969).
25. Doctors Convalescent Center, Inc. v. East Shore Newspapers, Inc., 104 Ill.
App. 2d 271, 244 N.E.2d 373 (5th Dist. 1968).
26. Turley v. W.T.A.X., Inc., 94 Ill. App. 2d 377, 236 N.E.2d 778 (4th Dist.
1968).
27. Cf. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
28. Special damages need to be established as part of a prima facie case in Illi-
nois in every defamation case except where the libel or slander is (1) defamation
on its face and (2) falls within the four common law per se categories noted in the
text. If the plaintiff needs to plead innuendo in Illinois, then special damages also
must be proved. See generally Coursey v. Greater Niles Township Publishing Corp.,
82 Ill. App. 2d 76, 227 N.E.2d 164 (1st Dist. 1967); Mitchell v. Peoria Journal-Star,
Inc., 76 I1. App. 2d 154, 221 N.E.2d 516 (3d Dist. 1966); Whitby v. Associates
Discount Corp., 59 IlI. App. 2d 337, 207 N.E.2d 482 (3d Dist. 1965).
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tween slander and libel suits in terms of the injury limitation, but
it remains an open question.29
If a libel suit is brought by a private individual in Illinois after
Gertz and constitutionally permissible recovery is limited to "actual
injury," what proof of injury must the plaintiff offer and how much
can the plaintiff recover? Unfortunately, a satisfactory answer is not
found in the opinion. Addressing the scope of actual injury, Justice
Powell stated:
We need not define "actual injury," as trial courts have wide experience in
framing appropriate jury instructions in tort action. Suffice it to say that
actual injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss. Indeed, the more custom-
ary types of actual harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood include impair-
ment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation,
and mental anguish and suffering. Of course, juries must be limited by ap-
propriate instructions, and all awards must be supported by competent evi-
dence concerning the injury, although there need be no evidence which as-
signs an actual dollar value to the injury. 30
This language clearly establishes that the plaintiff is not constitu-
tionally required to show out-of-pocket loss (special damages) to
prove actual injury. Direct testimony of loss of esteem or standing
in the community and emotional distress and/or humiliation ex-
perienced by the plaintiff is clearly sufficient to establish actual in-
jury. Instructions to the jury limiting the damage award to a dollar
value based upon the plaintiff's introduction of competent evidence
of injury are required. Beyond that, however, the language provides
state and federal courts with little guidance.
The majority in Gertz seems also to contemplate judicial review
of the amount of the damage award in terms of the relationship be-
tween the evidence introduced by the plaintiff and the money judg-
ment. But -what criteria is to be used in evaluating the excessiveness
of the money judgment in terms of the first amendment? The Court
chooses to leave that answer for a later day after state and federal
courts have struggled with implementing the constitutional require-
ments of the decision.
It is most likely that the actual injury concept of Gertz will prove
29. Justice Powell's opinion in Gertz applies in part a balancing of interest test.
This test arguably could support the view that a limitation to actual injury is not
required in slander suits because verbal utterances ought not be assigned the same
first amendment value that printed material is.
30. 94 S. Ct. 2997, 3012 (1974).
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to be a strong focal point of criticism. Virtually every state defama-
tion rule structure will be effected by the decision, and the open
textured nature of the concept as set down in the opinion guarantees
a stream of litigation at the federal and state level involving judicial
review of damage awards. The strain on federal court resources
may over the next few years cause a member of the majority to re-
assess their view.
It is supremely ironical that Justice Blackmun decided to change
from his support of the malice-public interest approach in private
libel suits in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. to the actual injury
approach in Gertz on the basis that a majority consensus was needed
to eliminate the "unsureness engendered by Rosenbloom's divers-
ity."'" Despite the fact that five Justices have agreed on a rationale
in Gertz, the decision leaves the scope of the constitutional dimen-
sions in private libel suits at least as uncertain as it was in Rosen-
bloom. Moreover, in view of the extensive common law privileges
operating in most states, 2 Gertz and the actual injury limitation
developed therein will alter defamation law to a more significant ex-
tent than its most famous predecessor, New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van.
Time, of course, will judge whether the actual injury approach of
the Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. provides adequate
protection for the first amendment in this most sensitive area of con-
stitutional balance. Negligence in the publication of a defamatory
utterance is a great deal easier to establish than that the utterance
was published with malice in the New York Times sense. More-
over, proof of actual injury by direct testimony of damage to reputa-
tion or emotional harm is considerably less difficult than proof of
out-of-pocket loss. For an attorney like plaintiff Gertz, numerous
witnesses supporting damage to reputation or emotional harm might
be easily accessible. These factors ought to provide considerable
incentive to litigate in private defamation suits.
It would seem also that the Supreme Court's reliance on the self-
restraint of juries and the supervision of state appellate courts in ap-
31. Id. at 3014 (concurring opinion).
32. A summary of the various qualified privileges of common law which gave the
defendant a defense of "good faith" may be found in W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS § 115 (4th ed. 1971).
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plication of the actual injury standard overlooks the considerable
abuse of damage judgments in defamation cases which have reached
the Supreme Court. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, for ex-
ample, the commissioner of police in Montgomery, Alabama re-
ceived a $500,000 judgment in the case where malice was initially
employed by the Court. It would not be surprising to see, within
a reasonably short time, significant increases in private defamation
suits as a result of Gertz. The decision, in this author's view, will
significantly undermine freedom of the press.
FORESEEABILITY AND THE DUTY ISSUE IN ILLINOIS
During this term an unusual number of cases with factual patterns
of general interest were decided by the Illinois Supreme Court.
Quite unexpectedly, the court in three of these cases ruled against
the plaintiff as a matter of law on the ground that the harm caused
to the plaintiff was outside the zone of foreseeability of the de-
fendant's actions. 33  In each of these, Justice Goldenhersh vigor-
ously dissented. Collectively, these three cases represent a startling
development in Illinois tort law whose importance would be difficult
to overstate.
Since these decisions were grounded on defendant's lack of duty
toward the plaintiff, they raise questions of general negligence
theory that are found more frequently in dialogues in law classrooms
than in appellate court opinions. One of these cases, Cunis v. Bren-
nan, 4 looks surprisingly like Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.,8 5
a case familiar to law students and lawyers mostly because of law
teachers' penchant for exploring every nook and cranny of the pecul-
iar facts and theories expressed in the case.
In tort litigation based upon negligence claims the appellate court
judge plays an important role in declaring Illinois tort policy. This
judicial law-declaring role is primarily accomplished through judicial
rulings on the existence and scope of a defendant's duty toward the
plaintiff. In a negligence case, the plaintiff is required to establish
33. See Winnett v. Winnett, 57 I11. 2d 7, 310 N.E.2d 1 (1974); Cunis v. Brennan,
56 Ii. 2d 372, 308 N.E.2d 617 (1974); Barnes v. Washington, 56 Ii. 2d 22, 305
N.E.2d 535 (1973).
34. 56 Ill. 2d 372, 308 N.E.2d 617 (1974).
35. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
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that the defendant owed a duty to conform to a legal standard of
conduct for the protection of the plaintiff against injury. The issue
of duty from defendant to plaintiff is threshold and precedes issues
of breach of duty or cause. Thus a trial or appellate court can take
a case from the trier of fact or set aside a jury verdict if the court
determines that no duty was owed by the defendant to the particular
plaintiff in the case.
In determining the scope of defendant's duty a variety of factors
are taken into account. Some of these factors are:
(1) the social, economic, and safety value of the activity which
produced the injury,
(2) the gravity of the harm likely to occur by the activity,
(3) the burden on the defendant and consequences to the com-
munity in imposing liability,
(4) the burden on the administration of the court system in im-
posing liability,
(5) the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance whereby
persons in the position of the defendant can adequately ac-
quire means of protection against such risks, and
(6) the foreseeability of harm.36
As what has been just stated suggests, foreseeability is but one
of the facts that is taken into account in the duty analysis. The
role that foreseeability ought to play in the duty analysis is one of
the recurring themes of tort literature. 7 Even assuming, however,
that foreseeability has a role to play in the duty question, several
additional considerations still remain. Foreseeability is an elastic con-
cept in tort law which is used in at least two senses. Harm may
be foreseeable in the narrow sense that both the exact person injured
and the precise manner in which the injury happened could reason-
ably have been anticipated. In a more general sense, harm may be
foreseen only in that the actor's conduct creates a foreseeable risk
that the general type of injury would be foreseen to -a general class
36. See generally Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L.
REv. 1014 (1928); cf. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S.
625 (1959).
37. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 286-89 (4th ed.
1971); Green, Foreseeability in Negligenpe Law, 61 COLUM. L. Rfv, 1401 (1961).
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of persons of which the plaintiff is part. Whether the general or
narrow sense of foreseeability ought to be employed in the duty ana-
lysis is also often written about in tort literature."8 Cunis v. Bren-
:an,89 probably the most significant of this term's decisions, ad-
dressed itself to both of the above problems.
Reasonable Foreseeability: Cunis v. Brennan
In Cunis v. Brennan,40 a negligence action was brought against
the Village of La Grange and others by a minor seeking damages
for amputation of his leg. The plaintiff alleged that he was thrown
thirty feet out of an automobile as a result of a collision and landed
upon the remains of an exposed drain pipe which impaled his leg
and necessitated its amputation. Count V of the plaintiff's complaint
alleged that the defendant village "was under a duty to maintain its
parkways in a safe condition and that it had 'failed in its duty toward
the plaintiff' by permitting a dangerous and broken drain pipe to re-
main on the parkway."'" The trial court granted defendant's motion
to dismiss Count V. The first district appellate court reversed. The
supreme court reversed the well-reasoned appellate court decision
in an opinion written by Justice Ward and held that, on the basis
of allegations in Count V, no duty was owed by the Village of La
Grange to the plaintiff.
The first question responded to by Justice Ward was whether fore-
seeability is to be the exclusive factor in the duty analysis. To this
question, Justice Ward responded with the often quoted language
of Professor Green:
However valuable the foreseeability formula may be in aiding a jury or
judge to reach a decision on the negligence issue, it is altogether inadequate
for use by the judge as a basis of determining the duty issue and its scope.
The duty issue, being one of law, is broad in its implication; the negligence
issue is confined to the particular case and has no implications for other
38. See generally Harper, The Foreseeability Factor in the Law of Torts, 7
NOTRE DAME LAW. 468 (1932); Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REv. 1
(1953); Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 HARv. L. REv. 72 (1942).
39. 56 Ill. 2d 372, 308 N.E.2d 617 (1974), rev'g 7 Ill. App. 3d 204, 287 N.E.2d
207 (lst Dist. 1972).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 374, 308 N.E.2d at 618.
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cases. There are many factors other than foreseeability that may condition
a judge's imposing or not imposing a duty in the particular case.42
Justice Ward then proceeded to unpack the concept of foreseeability
that was to apply to duty analysis in Illinois and employ it in the
case before the court. Several points were made. First, Justice
Ward stated that "reasonable foreseeability" and not simple forsee-
ability was the Illinois standard; second, reasonable foreseeability is
to be determined from the point of view of the alleged negligent
act and not the "hindsight" of the plaintiffs injury. Then applying
the foreseeability standard to the allegations in Count V of plaintiff's
complaint, Justice Ward concluded, "We hold that the remote pos-
sibility of the occurence did not give rise to a legal duty on the part
of the Village to the plaintiff to provide against his injury."43
The majority position in Cunis relies primarily upon Palsgraf v.
Long Island Railroad Co.," and an article written by Prosser 45 on
the case as well as on Mieher v. Brown,46 decided by the Illinois
Supreme Court last term. However, Palsgraf v. Long Island Rail-
road Co.,47 is sufficiently distinguishable to be of little guidance to
the court in Cunis. Palsgraf, a law professor's dream (and a law
student's nightmare), has become an analytic model for the instruc-
42. Id. at 375, 308 N.E.2d at 618-19, citing Green, Foreseeability in Negli-
gence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401, 1417-18 (1961).
43. 56 Il1. 2d at 377-78, 308 N.E.2d at 620.
44. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
45. See Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1953). Justice Ward's
reliance on Professor Prosser's analysis of PaIsgraf in a 1953 law review article is
inappropriate. The primary thrust of that article is to denigrate foreseeability as a
rationale for denying recovery in the case. Prosser finds the result in Palsgraf satis-
factory because of the "freakish, fantastic, cockeyed and far-fetched" combination of
events that were necessary to bring about the injury-a passenger hurrying to board
a train with firecrackers in an innocent brown bag, the agent knocking the package
out of the passenger's possession, the explosion, and a scale falling on the plaintiff's
foot 25 feet away. Surely there is a significant difference in the scope of the zone
of danger created by leaving a jagged pipe exposed above the ground four and one-
half feet from a busy intersection and the scope of the zone of danger created by
helping a passenger with an innocuous brown bag under his arm onto a train. The
sentence in Prosser's article following the quoted language used by the majority in
Cunis suggests that he would say that Cunis was different from Palsgraf because in
Cunis there was a "reasonably close connection between the harm threatened [per-
sonal injury to persons coming in contact with the pipe] and the harm done [mutila-
tion of the minor plaintiff's leg]." Id. at 32.
46. 54 II1. 2d 539, 301 N.E.2d 307 (1973).
47. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
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tion of general negligence theory. The unusual factual situation
presented to the New York Court of Appeals in Palsgraf marks it
a rare occasion when a "pure Palsgraf" case appears before a state
appellate court. In Palsgraf, the agent of a railroad was sued in
negligence for injury caused to the plaintiff while she was standing
on a platform when a scale fell on the plaintiff's foot. In helping
a passenger onto the train, some twenty-five to thirty feet from the
accident, the agent had caused a package to jar loose which con-
tained fire crackers. Upon impact, the package exploded, causing
the scale to fall.48 Under general negligence theory the duty of the
agent would be determined by looking at the injury from the point
of view of the allegedly negligent act-the helping of the passenger
onto the train. Viewed from that point, no duty was owed to the
injured plaintiff because one can say with certainty that no foresee-
able risk of injury to a person twenty-five feet away is created by
helping a person carrying an innocuous package onto a train. In
short, as Justice Cardozo said in Palsgraf, the injured party was an
unforeseeable plaintiff to whom no duty was owed. It is of consider-
able importance that foreseeability was used by Justice Cardozo in
the general sense.
Justice Andrews in dissent constructed a theory upon which liabil-
ity would be extended to the defendant. Since the defendant owed
a duty to the passenger helped onto the train, he owed a duty to
the whole world, which of course included the injured plaintiff.
However, foreseeability was introduced into the case by Justice An-
drews in the proximate cause analysis. Proximate cause was to be
determined by asking whether a foreseeable risk of injury to the
plaintiff was created at the time of the impact of the defendant's con-
duct. From the time of the explosion, a foreseeable risk of injury
to the plaintiff did exist, and therefore a cause of action was properly
stated.
Cunis does not involve the same factual pattern as Palsgraf. The
plaintiff in Cunis is not an unforeseeable plaintiff as was the plaintiff
in Palsgraf. Surely there is a significant difference in the scope of
48. Although the case was decided on appeal on the basis of these facts, Prosser,
after examining the record, concludes that the scale fell as a result of the crowd stam-




the zone of danger created by leaving a jagged pipe exposed above
the ground four and one-half feet from a busy intersection and the
scope of the zone of danger created by helping 'a passenger with an
innocuous brown bag under his arm onto a train. If the general
sense of foreseeability is applied to the facts of Cunis, then the plain-
tiff is within the zone of danger created by defendant's allegedly
negligent act. If duty is looked at from the failure of the village
to remove a rusty drain pipe located four and one-half feet from a
busy highway, then the plaintiff, a user of that highway, is a foresee-
able plaintiff. A rusty jagged pipe exposed above the ground within
five feet of a busy highway surely creates a general risk of injury
not only to users of the highway who stop for any reason that re-
quires that they leave the car but also to property thrown from a
truck traveling on the highway and to pedestrians or 'workers walking
on the parkway near the road, especially at night. Moreover, there
is no impact in Cunis analagous to the firecracker explosion in Pals-
graf. Without duty to a foreseeable plaintiff, impact and injury to
an unforeseeable plaintiff, Justice Andrews' theory has no applica-
tion.
Justice Goldenhersh dissents vigorously in Cunis in an opinion
which contains his full position on the sense and role of foreseeability
in the duty analysis. Justice Goldenhersh discusses precedent which
is not dealt with in the majority opinion and which is most relevant
to the facts before the court, namely, cases involving the duty of
municipalities to exercise care in respect to artificial conditions on
streets, sidewalks, and .parkways where such conditions create a risk
of injury to users of the streets, sidewalks, or parkways.4"  In these
cases, appellate courts use foreseeability in the general sense in the
duty analysis.5 0 To the majority's characterization of the injury to
plaintiff as unique or bizarre, Justice Goldenhersh cited analysis of
the authors of the Restatement of Torts:
49. See Storen v. City of Chicago, 373 II. 530, 27 N.E.2d 53 (1940); Kubala
v. Dudlow, 17 IlI. App. 2d 463, 150 N.E.2d 643 (3rd Dist. 1958).
50. See, e.g., Scarpaci v. Chicago, 329 Il1. App. 434, 69 N.E.2d 100 (1st Dist.
1946); Ferguson v. Springfield, 311 111. App. 655, 37 N.E.2d 563 (3d Dist. 1941);
Caruso v. Chicago, 278 I1. App. 247 (1st Dist. 1934); Potter v. Coffeyville, 142
Kan. 183, 45 P.2d 844 (1935); Jablonski v. Bay City, 248 Mich. 306, 226 N.W. 865
(1929); Harms v. Beatrice, 142 Neb.. 219, 5 N.W.2d 287 (1942); Muskogee v. Rob-
erts, 193 Okla. 61, 141 P.2d 100 (1943); Tulsa v. Ensign, 189 Okla. 507, 117 P.2d
1013 (1941); Schaut v. St. Mary's, 141 Pa. Super. 388, 14 A.2d 583 (1940).
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A possessor of land who creates or permits to remain thereon an excavation
or other artificial condition so near an existing highway that he realizes
or should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk to others accidentally
brought into contact with such condition while traveling with reasonable
care upon the highway, is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to persons who
(a) are traveling on the highway, or
(b) foreseeably deviate from it in the ordinary course of travel. 51
Plaintiff's statistics showing the percentage of accidents at intersec-
tions and persons thrown from vehicles would seem to clearly satisfy
the general sense of foreseeability required in section 368.52 In
Kubala v. Dudlow,53 the appellate court cited section 368 with ap-
proval in facts analogous to Cunis. Neither the Restatement nor
Kubala v. Dudlow were mentioned in the majority opinion.
Risk of Some Injury to the Plaintiff Versus
Risk of the Precise Injury that Plaintiff Incurred
Foreseeability as it is used by the court in Cunis may be better
understood by noting the distinction between the general and narrow
sense of the concept. Foreseeability in the general sense refers to
activity or omissions which create a foreseeable risk of the general
type of injury to a class of persons of which the plaintiff is part.
Foreseeability in the narrow sense is used to mean that the defend-
ant's activity or omission creates a foreseeable risk of the specific
injury which actually occurred to the plaintiff.
It is foreseeability in the latter narrow sense which Justice Ward
is employing when he concludes in Cunis that the plaintiff's injury
is too remote an occurrence to give rise to a legal duty of the Village
of La Grange. Foreseeability in the narrow sense of foresight of
the plaintiff's actual injury was employed by the supreme court last
term in Mieher v. Brown.54 Last year's analysis of torts published
in this Review contained an extensive examination of Mieher which
need not be restated here.55  Suffice to say that Mieher is the pred-
51. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SECOND) § 368 (1965).
52. 56 111. 2d 372, 375, 308 N.E.2d 617, 618 (1974).
53. 17 Ill. App. 2d 463, 150 N.E.2d 643 (3d Dist. 1958).
54. 54 Ill. 2d 539, 301 N.E.2d 307 (1973).
55. See generally Turkington, Torts, 1972-1973 Survey of Illinois Law, 23 DE-
PAUL L. REv. 464 (1973) for the author's analysis and position on Mieher.
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ecessor of Cunis and was principally relied upon by Justice Ward
in the decision.
In Mieher v. Brown,56 the representatives of a person allegedly
killed after a collision with a truck manufactured without a bumper
proceeded against the defendant manufacturer on the theory that the
,truck had been negligently designed. On appeal from an appellate
court decision upholding the sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint,
the supreme court reversed. In so doing, the court held that the
manufacturer owed no duty to prevent injuries to the plaintiff result-
ing from the "extraordinary occurrences" of that case. The narrow
sense of foreseeability employed in Mieher and Cunis appeared in
two other supreme court cases this term as the primary ground for
ruling against the plaintiff in the pleadings.
Barnes v. Washington
Barnes v. Washington5 7 reached the Illinois Supreme Court after
years of litigation at the lower court level. The case was decided
on the basis of the following facts and theory of liability. Jessie
Barnes, a 37 year old mental incompetent, became intoxicated after
visiting a tavern on the southside of Chicago. After leaving the
tavern with persons he had met, he was left early in the morning
on the street adjacent to railroad tracks owned by the defendant, Il-
linois Central Railroad Company. Barnes reached a boxcar of the
defendant's through a hole in a fence maintained by the railroad.
For three days he was locked in the boxcar. He was found in a
switch shanty in the railroad yards in Decatur, Illinois, 175 miles
south of Chicago. His extremities were frozen to the extent that
amputations were required. The negligence theory against defend-
ant was based upon the railroad's failure (1) to properly mend a
hole in the fence through which the plaintiff reached the boxcar and
(2) to inspect their cars for children or incompetents before locking
them.
The first district appellate court upheld plaintiff's theory of lia-
bility by holding that the railroad owed the same duty to the plaintiff
56. 54 Ill. 2d 539, 301 N.E.2d 307 (1973).
57. 56 II1. 2d 22, 305 N.E.2d 535 (1973), rev'g 4 IlL. App. 3d 513, 281 N.E.2d
380 (lst Dist. 1972).
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as was owed to a child trespasser. Justice McNamara reasoned that
the policies behind the child trespasser rule applied equally to an
adult whose mental deficiency significantly affected his ability to ap-
preciate the risk of injury present in artificial conditions on the
property.
In reversing the appellate court, the supreme court rejected the
proposition that the railroad owed the same duty to the injured plain-
tiff as would be owed to a child. In this analysis, foreseeability in
the narrow sense played an important role:
For instance, an adult incompetent may have no difficulty in raising himself
into an open box car from the ground, whereas it would be difficult, if not
impossible, for an immature child to do so. For this reason we must reject
the plaintiff's contention and the general holding of the appellate court that
a mentally incompetent adult should be afforded the same protection as a
child of tender years.5 8
To the plaintiff's proof that children and adults had entered the de-
fendant's property through the holes in the fence for a number of
years, had used the railroad's property as a shortcut and had played
on the embankment adjacent to the tracks, Justice Ward responded:
[W]e conclude that the defendant would have no reason to believe or know,
even if children did play on the embankment and use it for a shortcut, that
someone, at 1:30 A.M., would be likely to board one of its cars and be in-
jured.5 9
Finally, the court concluded that the likelihood of the injury to the
plaintiff under the circumstances was too minimal to impose a duty
under the circumstances on the railroad even to a child trespasser,
and thus the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff.
Justice Goldenhersh, joined by Justice Kluczynski, found that the
allegations were sufficient to impute knowledge of trespassers to the
defendant and impose a duty from the defendant to the plaintiff on
that basis.
Epilogue
Although the role of foreseeability on the negligence issue con-
tinues to be disputed in literature, use of the narrow sense of fore-
seeability by the Illinois Supreme Court is clearly contrary to the
mainstream of judicial thinking when the question before the court
58. Id. at 28, 305 N.E.2d at 538.
59. Id. at 29, 305 N.E.2d at 539.
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is whether a sufficient relationship between the parties exists to sub-
mit breach of duty and/or cause to the jury. It is not incorrect, for
example, to suggest -that it is an established rule that if some risk
of personal injury to the plaintiff is created by ,the defendant's ac-
tions (general foreseeability), the fact that the injury actually in-
curred was brought about by unforeseeable means does not negate
the existence of a duty running from the defendant to the plaintiff. 0
A preliminary analysis of general foreseeability on the duty issue
is probably desirable as a gesture of fidelity toward both a familiar
language structure and the risk or fault theory of negligence. This
theory, 'based as it is upon reasonable appreciation and response to
dangers incident to activity, demands at least that the plaintiff be
within a general zone of danger created by what the defendant was
doing or failed to do."'
Beyond this, courts generally leave the question of foreseeability
in its other almost unlimited senses to the jury as it considers breach
of duty and/or cause. Indeed, such is the policy in Illinois where
foreseeability of injury is an essential component of the proximate
cause question. 6 In fact, it might be said of Cunis and Barnes that
the supreme court's use of foreseeability in the duty question is su-
perfluous because it simply restates Illinois 'policy on the cause ques-
tion.
Several reasons for the general reluctance of courts to let foresee-
ability of plaintiffs precise injury be a dominant factor in the duty
'analysis can 'be identified. Foremost of these is the imprecise, elas-
60. See, e.g., Munsey v. Webb, 231 U.S. 150 (1913); Washington & Georgetown
R.R. v. Hickey, 166 U.S. 521 (1897); Johnson v. Kosmos Portland Cement Co., 64
F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1933); Gibson v. Garcia, 96 Cal. App. 2d 681, 216 P.2d 119
(1950); Carroll v. Central Counties Gas Co., 74 Cal. App. 303, 240 P. 53 (1925);
Van Cleef v. City of Chicago, 240 111. 318, 88 N.E. 815 (1909); Teasdale v. Beacon
Oil Co., 266 Mass. 25, 164 N.E. 612 (1929); Dalton v. Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co., 241 Mass. 400, 135 N.E. 318 (1922); Salisbury v. Herchenroder, 106 Mass.
458, 8 Am. R. 354 (1871); McDowell v. Village of Preston, 104 Minn. 263, 116
N.W. 470 (1908); Moore v. Townsend, 76 Minn. 64, 78 N.W. 880 (1899); Derosier
v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 81 N.H. 451, 130 A. 145 (1925); Riley v. Standard
Oil Co. v. Indiana, 214 Wis. 15, 252 N.W. 183 (1934).
1 61. See generally Harper, The Foreseeability Factor in the Law of Torts, 7 No-
TRE DAME LAW. 468 (1932).
62. See Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 I11. 2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74 (1954); Hays v.
Place, .350 Ill...App. _504, 113 N.E.2d. 1.78 (4th Dist. 1953); Mahan v. Richardson,
284 I1. App. 493, 1 N.E,2d 100 (1st Dist. 1936).
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tic, open-ended nature of the concept. Dean Prosser has written
a great deal about this, and what he has said would be difficult to
improve upon." Whether harm .to the plaintiff is foreseeable will
depend in part upon what point in time the injury is looked at.
Looking at the foreseeability of the injury with the hindsight of the
knowledge of the precise events which came together -to cause the
harm, almost everything seems foreseeable. From the point in time
of the negligent act, the scope of foreseeability is somewhat more
restricted. Indeed, Dean Prosser has even suggested that Mrs. Pals-
graf was a foreseeable plaintiff if the duty of the railroad is viewed
in terms of its leaving a scale which could easily topple on a platform
frequented with passengers.64 Foreseeability will also depend in
part on the personal experiences of the person using the concept.
I have found significant disagreement in a law classroom as to
whether injury posed in various hypothetical factual situations is
foreseeable. Surely, there will also be considerable disagreement
regarding the court's conclusion that the injury to the plaintiff in
Barnes or Cunis is unforeseeable. Is it not, for example, patent non-
sense to conclude, as the court did in Barnes v. Washington, that
the physical size of children makes it unforeseeable that trespassing
children will climb into open railroad cars?
The uncertain nature of the concept of foreseeability makes it
particularly inappropriate as a major device for an appellate court
to employ in exercising its law-declaring role. The force of prec-
edent and the demands for certainty for purposes of economic plan-
ning cast the appellate court judge in the role of a law-declarer when
that judge determines the existence and scope of the defendant's
duty toward the plaintiff. Moreover, we also demand that appellate
judges publish good reasons in an opinion and parade them for all
to see so that courts have some degree of accountability to the public.
Strong public disagreement over judge-made policy can, after all,
sometimes produce changes through the legislature.
The narrow concept of foreseeability employed by all of the jus-
,tices of the Illinois Supreme Court except Justice Goldenhersh in
Cunis and Barnes frustrates the law-declaring role of the court. Un-
63. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 267 (4th ed. 1971); Pros-
ser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1953).
64. See Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 7 (1953).
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doubtedly, foreseeability as used by the majority of the court in these
cases masks inarticulated policy. It hardly need be stated that inar-
ticulated policy is no policy at all. Perhaps the Illinois Supreme
Court in Mieher, Cunis, and Barnes is really saying that plaintiffs'
attorneys and juries have gone too far and that the extension of a
duty to the plaintiffs in each of these cases would produce a flood-
gate of litigation that would tax the administration of the already bur-
dened court system in Illinois beyond its limits. It might even be
that the court is really saying that the injured mental incompetent
in Barnes and the injured minor in Cunis are in a better position,
given the availability of insurance, to pay for the cost of protecting
against the risk than the Illinois Central Railroad or the Village of
La Grange. Lawyers, legislators, manufacturers, villages, munici-
palities, users of highways, and citizens generally expect courts to
respond to these and other questions presented by the duty question
on the facts of the two cases that have been discussed in this section.
Instead of such response, they get an ad hoc judicial dropping of
the buck.
FORESEEABILITY AND STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY:
Winnett v. Winnett
Since strict liability in tort for product defects is principally based
upon economic policy factors, foreseeability has played an even less
important role in defective products litigation based upon strict lia-
bility than in negligence litigation. In a strict liability products case,
foreseeability considerations are primarily promoted through the in-
tended use doctrine which limits a manufacturer's liability to injuries
incurred from an intended use of the product. 5 Foreseeability is
used in the general sense in the intended use doctrine. In Winnett
v. Winnett0 6 the Illinois Supreme Court again built from the narrow
sense of foreseeability developed in Mieher and found against the
plaintiff on the pleadings in a strict liability defective products case
brought against the manufacturer of a forage wagon. In Winnett,
65. See also, e.g., Phillips v. Ogle Aluminum Furniture, Inc., 106 Cal. App. 2d
650, 235 P.2d 857 (1951); cf. Ringstad v. I. Magnin & Co., 39 Wash. 2d 923, 239
P.2d 848 (1952).
66. 57 II1. 2d 7, 310 N.E.2d 1 (1974), rev'g 9 Il1. App. 3d 644, 292 N.E.2d 524
(4th Dist. 1973).
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a suit was brought on behalf of a four year old girl for injuries in-
curred by her when she placed her hand on a moving conveyor belt
or screen on a forage wagon which was then being operated on her
grandfather's farm. Recovery was sought against the grandfather
for negligence and against the manufacturer of the forage wagon in
strict liability. The trial court dismissed the cause of action against
the manufacturer. The fourth district appellate court reversed. On
appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the appellate court decision
was reversed and the circuit court opinion affirmed.
In reversing the appellate court, Chief Justice Underwood, speak-
ing for all the court except Justice Goldenhersh, stated:
In our judgment the liability of a manufacturer properly encompasses only
those individuals to whom injury from a defective product may reasonably
be foreseen and only those situations where the product is being used for
the purpose for which it was intended or for which it is reasonably fore-
seeable that it may be used.
6 7
Reasonable foreseeability as applied to the case, continued Justice
Underwood, depends upon whether "it can be fairly said that
[the child's] conduct in placing her fingers in the moving screen or
belt of the forage wagon was reasonably foreseeable. '6 8  Then the
justice concluded that it was not.
If the adult driver of the farm wagon or an adult helper had been
injured by placing a hand on the conveyor belt, it would be startling
for an appellate court in a strict products liability case to find the
injury not reasonably foreseeable. Yet the Illinois Supreme Court
finds such an injury in regard to a child not reasonably foreseeable.
If there are policy reasons for distinguishing between the sufficiency
of a four year old child's complaint -and an adult's complaint in a
strict liability case based upon the essential facts of Winnett, they are
not apparent to this writer. Policy considerations in Illinois and else-
where as expressed in the special duties imposed upon defendants
in regard to child trespassers would support favoring the child and
not the adult in cases like Winnett.
Surprisingly, the above quoted language and reasoning of the
court in Winnett suggests that in a products case in Illinois based
upon strict liability both the plaintiff's injury and the use of the
67. Id. at 11,310 N.E.2d at 4.
68. Id. at 12-13, 310 N.E.2d at 4-5.
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product must be foreseeable. Something of the unique nature of
Justice Underwood's reasoning can be gleaned by Justice Golden-
hersh's response in dissent:
The majority correctly notes that every authority which it cites supports a
result contrary to that achieved by its opinion and then without the aid of
either precedent or reasoning proceeds to hold that the occurrence alleged
in plaintiff's second amended complaint was not "objectively reasonable to
expect."6 9
The assault on the doctrine of privity and economic policy con-
siderations supporting the strict liability standard has produced an
extension of liability in products cases to the nonuser by most juris-
dictions which recognize the tort. As discussed later in this Article,
the Supreme Court of Illinois assumed that liability was extended
to the nonuser in 1965 when it introduced the tort of strict liability
for product defect in Suvada v. White Motor Co. 70  As long as
the product was being used in a way that was intended, the fact
-that the injured party was a nonuser of the product or a bystander
has not been controlling even in cases where the injury was remote.
Foreseeabiity in such cases has been limited to the intended use
aspect of the problem. 71  In Piecejield v. Remington Arms Co.,72
for example, the Supreme Court of Michigan found the manufac-
turer of a shotgun shell liable for injuries caused 'to a person who
suffered injuries when the barrel of a shotgun his brother was using
exploded as a result of a defect in the shell. The manufacturer of
an automobile engine which blew up was held liable for injuries to
a person who was in a chain collision caused ,by a cloud of steam
and gas restricting the visibility of other drivers by the Missouri Su-
preme Court in Giberson v. Ford Motor Co.73  An eighth circuit
federal appeals court in a diversity suit involving Iowa tort law ex-
tended the duty of the manufacturer of hubcaps to a person who
was thrown off a motorcycle and injured as a result of hubcap pro-
69. Id. at 13, 310 N.E.2d at 5.
70. 32 IIl. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965). See text accompanying note 78 infra.
71. California, perhaps the leading jurisdiction in development of strict liability
in tort, very recently recognized the role of foreseeability in a products case as limited
to the intended use aspect of the problem in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal.
3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153 (1972).
72. 375"Mich. 85, 133"N.W.2d 129 (1965).
73. 504 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. 1974).
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trusions in Passwaters v. General Motors Corp.7 4  A further dram-
atic example of this trend in products liability suits is Sills v. Massey-
Ferguson, Inc.,75 decided by a federal court in 1969, and involving
interpretation of Indiana law where the manufacturer of a lawn-
mower was denied his motion to dismiss where the plaintiff's alleged
injuries were caused by a bolt thrown 180 feet by a lawnmower.
Several other cases could be added to -this list.76  In none of the
above cases is there even a suggestion -that both the use of the prod-
uct and the precise injury to the plaintiff must be foreseen for a duty
to be imposed upon the manufacturer of the product.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin recognized the overriding
economic policy considerations underlying the theory of strict prod-
ucts liability in tort and expressly rejected ,the use of foreseeability
to limit recovery by injured parties who are neither users nor con-
sumers in Howes v. Hansen.77
Nearly a decade ago the Illinois Supreme Court firmly embraced
the "deep pockets economic policy" rationale for strict liability 'tort
recovery in defective products cases:
Without extended discussion, it seems obvious that public interest in human
life and health, the invitations and solicitations to purchase the product and
the justice of imposing the loss on the one creating the risk and reaping
the profit are present and as compelling in cases involving motor vehicles
and other products, where the defective. condition makes them unreasonably
dangerous to the user, as they are in food cases.78
In the nine years since Suvada was decided, Illinois appellate courts
have experienced difficuilty implementing the policy of strict liability
enunciated in Suvada. A dramatic example of this can be found
in the confusion over whether assumption of the risk or contributory
negligence is to be a defense in such suits. 79 The products liability
philosophy of the Illinois Supreme Court in Winnett is a world apart
from the products liability view of the court in Suvada. Use of fore-
74. 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972).
_75." 296F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Ind,:19.69.). . . " .
76. See, e.g., Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 451 P.2d 84
(1969); Howes v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247; 201 N.W.2d 825 (1972).
77. 56 Wis. 2d 247, 201 N.W.2d 825 (1972)..
78. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 619, 210 N.E.2d 182, 186 (1965).
79. See Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill.2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970).
Compare Sweeney v. Matthews, 94 Ill. App. 2d 6, 236'N.E.2d'439 (1st Dist. 1968).
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seeability in any sense outside the intended use doctrine is as out
of place in a strict products liability suit as is the defense of contribu-
tory negligence. Contributory negligence and foreseeability are
both essential components of the fault negligence dialogue. Inter-
jection of them into a strict liability product suit operates at cross
purposes with the dominant deep pockets economic policy basis of
the tort. Winnett v. Winnett is a dramatic example of the injustice
that may be produced from the misuse of fault concepts in a strict
products liability case.
DUTY TO ANTICIPATE CRIMINAL CONDUCT OF OTHERS
The scope of liability in negligence for activities or omissions
which combine with another person's criminal conduct to cause in-
jury to the plaintiff has proved to be a particuliarly troublesome area
of tort law. Sometimes it is dealt with in the proximate cause dial-
ogue as a question of foreseeable, superceding, efficient, or interven-
ing force. 80 Mostly it is dealt with as a duty question.8' A central
plank of the duty analysis in such cases is the principle that a reason-
able person is not expected to anticipate that persons will commit
criminal acts. In many situations, however, it is reasonable to an-
ticipate intentional misconduct, and when this is so, a person may
'be required to take reasonable steps to minimize the risk of criminal
conduct to third parties.82 Perhaps the most common example is
where the likelihood of an intervening act is increased by the activity
or omission of the defendant. If, for example, the borrower of an
automobile leaves keys in the ignition of a vehicle and it is stolen,
a duty is extended to the owner of the vehicle for damage to the
property from the intervening criminal act. Sometimes in such cases
the duty is even extended to persons injured as a result of the negli-
80. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 282-84 (4th ed.
1971).
81. See, e.g., id. at 173-74. See also Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d
75, 154 N.E.2d 534 (1958).
82. Much of this area is affected by policy related in part to special legal rela-
tions existing between the parties. See, e.g., McFadden v. Bancroft Hotel Corp., 313
Mass. 56, 46 N.E.2d 573 (1943) (guest and innkeeper); David v. Missouri Pac. R.R.,
328 Mo. 437, 41 S.W.2d 179 (1932) (employee and employer); McLeod v. Grant
County School Dist., 42 Wash. 2d 316, 255 P.2d 360 (1953) (pupil and school dis-
trict).
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gence of the thief.83 Whether it is reasonable to anticipate criminal
conduct will many times turn upon the particular facts of a case.
Past criminal activity, for example, may impose a duty on the owner
or occupier of property to take reasonable steps to protect others
where no duty would generally exist.84
When an actual crime is taking place with the knowledge of a per-
son, the question of duty in respect to that criminal conduct of course
does not involve considerations of the foreseeability of criminal con-
duct. The duty analysis in such cases becomes a pure matter of
policy involving some of the most difficult choice of values that an
appellate court has to make. This term, the Illinois Supreme Court
was faced with this most difficult. task in a case arising from tragic
facts.
In Boyd v. Racine Currency Exchange, Inc.,8 5 the supreme court
reversed a first district appellate court decision which had reversed
the trial court in dismissing a wrongful death action brought by a
person killed in a currency exchange by an armed robber. The de-
ceased was present in the currency exchange for the purpose of
transacting business. While he was there, a robber entered and
placed a pistol to his head and told the teller to open the door and
give him money or he would kill Boyd. The teller did not comply
with the demand but instead fell to the floor behind a bulletproof
window and partition. Boyd was then shot in the head and died.
Several allegations of negligence on the part of the currency ex-
change in the hiring and training of personnel to deal with criminal
conduct were contained in the complaint. In rejecting the plaintiff's
claim that a duty was owed by the defendant, the supreme court
speaking through Justice Ryan characterized the plaintiff's theory as
based on a business proprietor's duty to honor criminal demands
when failure to do so would suggest an invitation to unreasonable
risk. Justice Ryan noted that the New Jersey and Pennsylvania
courts were divided as to whether to extend a duty to the business
83. See Mellish v. Cooney, 23 Conn. Supp. 350, 183 A.2d 753 (1962); cf. Mei-
host v. Meihost, 29 Wis. 2d 537, 139 N.W.2d 116 (1966). This may not be the
case in Illinois. See generally Lorang v. Heinz, 108 Ill. App. 2d 451, 248 N.E.2d
785 (2d Dit. 1969).
84. See Neering v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 383 IH. 366, 50 N.E.2d 497 (1943).
85. 56 Ill. 2d 95, 306 N.E.2d 39 (1973), rev'g 8 Ill. App. 3d 140, 289 N.E.2d
218 (1st Dist. 1972).
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owner in similar circumstances. The imposition of such a duty must,
according to Justice Ryan, be rejected because it would only benefit
the criminal and encourage use of hostages:
If a duty is imposed on the Currency Exchange to comply with such a de-
mand the same would only inure to the benefit of the criminal without af-
fording the desired degree of assurance that compliance with the demand
will reduce the risk to the invitee .... In this particular case the result
may appear to be harsh and unjust, but, for the protection of future business
invitees, we cannot afford to extend to the criminal another weapon in his
arsenal8 G6
Justice Goldenhersh dissented in Boyd, taking the position that
the currency exchange owed a duty to the plaintiff and the case
should have been submitted to the jury.
The New Jersey Superior Court has adopted a position similar -to
that expressed by Justice Goldenhersh. In Genovay v. Fox,87 the
appellate court held that a cause of action was stated in a case
brought against the proprietor of a bar by an injured patron who was
shot by a robber after the proprietor had failed to comply with the
robbers demand. The balance according to the New Jersey court
was somewhat different:
The value of human life and of the interest of the individual in freedom
from serious bodily injury weighs sufficiently heavily on the judicial scales
to preclude a determination as a matter of law that they may be disregarded
simply because the defendant's activities serve to frustrate the successful
accomplishment of a felonious act and to save his property from loss. 8 8
Reasonable persons will differ as to whether the choice of values of
the appellate court in Genovay or the armchair behaviorism of the su-
preme court in Boyd is more desirable. Maybe prospective criminals
know of and rely on Illinois Supreme Court decisions and maybe they
do not. Moreover, it is little solace to the family of the deceased
to say that no recovery is to be given so that future customers of
the currency exchange will not be subjected to unreasonable risk.
But it is precisely this kind of responsibility that the legal system has
assigned to the highest appellate court of a state. At least the policy
has been articulated and the court is accountable. If there is a press-
ing need to change Illinois policy, the legislature may do so.
86. Id. at 100, 306 N.E.2d at 42.
87. 50 N.J. Super. 538, 143 A.2d 229 (1958), rev'd on other grounds, 29 N.J.
436, 149 A.2d 212 (1959).
88. Id. at 558, 143 A.2d at 239.
Two appellate court cases involving somewhat different facts from
Boyd upheld the imposition of a duty on the part of the business
owner where the plaintiff's injury was caused by criminal activity.
Perhaps the most dramatic of the two, Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods, Inc., 9
involved a negligence suit brought against a foodstore owner for the
death of a policeman who was killed by a criminal while making a
security check at the defendant's business. The fifth district re-
versed the dismissal of plaintiffs complaint in an opinion written by
Justice Moran. Jacobsma v. Goldberg's Fashion Forum,90 decided by
the first district appellate court, sustained the sufficiency of a com-
plaint of negligence against a store owner for injuries received by
a customer who, in response to a request by the storeowner, at-
tempted to stop a fleeing shoplifter. The supreme court decision
in Boyd v. Racine Currency Exchange, Inc. does not require a dif-
ferent result in either Fancil or Jacobsma for the rather obvious
reason that the policy reason which Boyd was primarily grounded
upon is not applicable to the facts of either case. Moreover, since
in the circumstances of each case it was reasonable to anticipate the
criminal conduct, the duty analysis is consistent with Neering v. Il-
linois Central Railroad Co.,91 an Illinois Supreme Court case con-
trolling on the imposition of a duty toward owners or occupiers to
take reasonable steps to protect third persons from the criminal ac-
tivities of others.
USE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR TO PROVE MALPRACTICE
IN ILLINOIS
When a claim is pressed against a physician or other professional
for negligence in the care of a patient, the doctor in Illinois92 and
elsewhere98 enjoys the benefit of a special standard of care which
is based upon how a reasonable person of good standing in the pro-
fession would have acted. A corollary of this subjective standard
of care for physicians is the general requirement that expert testi-
89. 19 111. App. 3d 414, 311 N.E.2d 745 (5th Dist. 1974).
90. 14 Ill. App. 3d 710, 303 N.E.2d 226 (1st Dist. 1973).
91. 383 Il1. 366, 50 N.E.2d 497 (1943).
92. Schireson v. Walsh, 354 Ill. 40, 187 N.E. 921 (1934).
93. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 161-66 (4th ed.
1971).
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mony be offered by the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of
negligence. 94 The subjective standard of care and expert testimony
rule has also been the primary consideration leading to the general
refusal of appellate courts to allow the plaintiff to use res ipsa loqui-
tor to establish a prima facie case in a malpractice suit. Dictum in
Graham v. St. Luke's Hospital, 5 a first district appellate court deci-
sion, rejected the doctrine as applicable to malpractice suits.
There are at least two situations where injury to a patient is so
obviously the result of negligence that courts have suspended the
expert testimony requirement and allowed res ipsa loquitor to estab-
lish negligence in a malpractice suit. One such case is where an
item is left inside the patient.96 The second is where there is injury
to a part of the patient's body outside the area of the operation which
was healthy before the operation.97  Thirty years ago, the California
Supreme Court in Ybarra v. Spangard,98 a case involving the latter
exception, allowed res ipsa loquitor to establish negligence. Ybarra
was a particularly important decision because the court allowed
res ipsa loquitor against all of the professionals having control of
the operation because the plaintiff was unconscious and unable to
show exactly which person had controlled the instrumentality caus-
ing the injury.
In Edgar County Bank and Trust Co. v. Paris Hospital, Inc.,99 de-
cided this term, the Supreme Court of Illinois for the first time held
that in limited cases res ipsa loquitor may be used to establish a prima
facie case of negligence against a physician. The plaintiff sought
recovery for paralysis allegedly caused by the administration of a
hypodermic in the buttock by agents of defendant's hospital. In
Count IV of the plaintiff's complaint res ipsa loquitor was pleaded
to establish a prima facie case. The count alleged that a registered
nurse and physician employed in the emergency room by the hospi-
94. Id. at 164.
95. 46 11. App. 2d 147, 196 N.E.2d 355 (lst Dist. 1964).
96. See, e.g., Easterling v. Walton, 208 Va. 214, 156 S.E.2d 787 (1967).
97. See, e.g., Brown v. Shortlidge, 98 Cal App. 352, 277 P. 134 (1929); Evans
v. Roberts, 172 Iowa 653, 154 N.W. 923 (1915); cf. Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72
Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967).
98. 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
99. 57 11. 2d 298, 312 N.E.2d 259 (1974), rev'g in part 10 Ill. App. 3d 465,
294 N.E.2d 319 (4th Dist. 1973).
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tal administered an intramuscular injection in the buttock of a seven-
teen month old child and that the injection was the proximate cause
of injury to the child's foot, calf, hip, and knee. The trial judge
dismissed Count IV of plaintiff's complaint and was affirmed by the
appellate court. In reversing, the Illinois Supreme Court, speaking
through Justice Goldenhersh, held that res ipsa loquitor was ap-
plicable to the intramuscular injection injury in the case.
With factual allegations like those in Edgar, it is fairly certain that
someone was negligent. Additional problems, however, are pre-
sented in respect to the application of res ipsa loquitor because more
than one person was in control of the activity which caused the injury
and knowledge as to what actually happened is in the possession of
the defendant. The plaintiff cannot establish that any person had
exclusive control of the instrumentality that caused the injury. Thus
the purely evidence role of res ipsa loquitor is not satisfied because
it does not necessarily follow that any particular person was negli-
gent. When the defendants have superior or exclusive knowledge
of evidence as to what actually happened, res ipsa loquitor is used
to smoke out the evidence by causing the defendant to come forth
with an explanation for the injury. Ybarra v. Spangard,100 the land-
mark California case noted earlier, extended res ipsa loquitor to mul-
tiple defendants primarily to promote the policy of smoking out evi-
dence in possession of the defendants. Likewise, Justice Golden-
hersh in the instant case supported use of res ipsa loquitor to promote
such a policy in Illinois.10'
Edgar County Bank and Trust Co. v. Paris Hospital, Inc. repre-
sents a significant development in medical malpractice law in Illinois.
By approving the use of res ipsa loquitor in the case, the Illinois Su-
preme Court has taken a considerable step toward breaking down
some of the excessive restrictions of the expert testimony rule in mal-
practice suits.
100. 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
101. Justice Goldenhersh relied particularly on policy expressed by the court in
Metz v. Central Ill. Elec. & Gas Co., 32 Ill. 2d 446, 207 N.E.2d 305 (1965).
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